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The day I finished this book, a verdict was rendered in the second murder trial
of the famous record producer Phil Spector here in Los Angeles. I watched a clip
on the evening news of the foreperson of the jury, speaking about the jury's efforts.
In obvious emotional distress, her voice breaking and eyes tearing up, the
foreperson described how painful the decision had been. "For anybody in our
shoes, you have no idea .... It's tough to be on a jury."' The jury had heard
weeks of testimony and spent some thirty hours deliberating before finding Spector
guilty of second-degree murder. The first trial in the case had ended in a mistrial,
the jury having been unable to agree on a verdict.
Author James Q. Whitman would not have been surprised at the foreperson's
distress. He would likely say that early English jurors had the same experience,
only worse. Indeed, the essential message of this fascinating work of legal history
is that a key problem in the creation of jury trials was the emotional anxiety of
jurors, which made them reluctant to convict for the most serious offenses. Jurors
did not want to convict even the obviously guilty in some cases, especially where
death was the penalty. Nor was this a new problem for the law. Premodern legal
systems had faced the same reluctance on the part of participants, or even potential
participants, to contribute to a conviction that would lead to imposition of the most
serious forms of punishment.
The solution of the English common law to the problem of conscience-
stricken jurors-the reasonable doubt standard of guilt-was drawn from medieval
Christian theology about judgment, Whitman says. The twist is that, per Whitman,
this standard was originally designed to boost convictions by giving jurors moral
reassurance in finding a defendant guilty. This is nearly the opposite of the
modem view of the rule, which is seen as aimed at ensuring fact accuracy, and
especially, preventing the conviction of the innocent.
Whitman's book documents just how different the premodem and early
modem Western world was from ours today. Once the most difficult criminal
cases were resolved by physical ordeals, blessed by clergy that called on the
judgment of God; today we have elaborate criminal trials overseen by judges
Professor of Law and Interfaith Chaplain, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Phil Spector Jury Says Verdict was a 'Painful' Decision, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 14, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/celebritynews/phil-spector/5152798/Phil-Spector-jury-
says-verdict-was-a-painful-decision.html.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
decided by jurors according to well-developed and entirely secular law. In earlier
ages, many feared damnation by God for wrongfully condemning an accused.
Today the decision-maker's greatest fear is making a mistake about the facts,
leading either to the conviction of an innocent person, or the acquittal of a guilty
one.
Whitman argues that American criminal law has not come to grips with this
fundamental change. In particular, he argues that the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt rule is archaic, at least as currently stated. He categorizes it as a moral
comfort rule, originally designed to assuage the emotional/religious anxieties of
decision-makers, and asserts that it does not serve well the needs of modem
criminal decision-makers who are primarily concerned with fact-finding. I am not
convinced, at least not entirely. I will argue that Whitman's view of moral comfort
rules as archaic depends on a view of decision-maker anxieties, religion, and
criminal adjudication, each of which can be questioned in important respects.
Whitman also argues-and here fully I agree-that there is a lesson for
modem decision-makers in the experience of our predecessors. A basic challenge
of criminal law remains how to structure legal responsibility so as to reassure
conscientious decision-makers about the rightness of their decisions, but without
providing so much reassurance that they become morally casual about rendering
judgment. Whitman argues modem law has done a good job of developing
procedures that ease the individual decision-maker's sense of responsibility for
imposing serious punishment-perhaps too good a job. Especially with respect to
the imposition of severe punishment, he says that criminal law decisions should be
approached with more of the "fear and trembling" that our ancestors reported in
facing their most serious judgments. I concur. This may be the most important
lesson of this history.
The Origins of Reasonable Doubt is fundamentally about responsibility for
imposing the worst criminal punishments: both the actual division of legal
responsibility, and the various participants' sense of responsibility. Whitman
identifies two different responsibility challenges for any criminal decision-maker:
(1) the assessment of factual proof, and (2) making moral judgments about
defendants and their conduct. Whitman is most concerned with the latter, arguing
that it was the preeminent concern of premodem criminal law. Fearing divine
damnation for wrongfully condemning a fellow human being, victims were
reluctant to accuse, witnesses were reluctant to testify, and judges-and later
jurors-were reluctant to convict.
This review opens with an overview of the legal and theological history
Whitman provides. We begin with premodern legal systems in both England and
on the continent that relied on physical ordeals to resolve the most difficult cases.
We proceed to the replacements of the ordeal in the early Middle Ages: the
inquisitorial system on the continent and jury trials in England. Finally we track
the emergence of the modem criminal jury system and the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard in Anglo-American criminal justice in the late 18th century.
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Next we move to critique, focusing particularly on Whitman's distinction
between factual proof and moral comfort rules. The issue, both historical and
contemporary, is whether moral comfort rules were (and are) essentially addressed
to the nonrational anxieties of decision-makers, or whether they also addressed
(and address) real problems in moral judgment. This inquiry leads to questions
about Whitman's treatment of religion, and the possibility that several scriptural
sources he cites might provide, even today, important limits on criminal judgment.
Finally, we take up what Whitman sees as the modem implications of the
history. These range from questions about contemporary jury instructions on
reasonable doubt to larger concerns about fact-finding by American criminal
juries. But the most important implications of this history may be how we
approach decisions to impose severe punishment, especially long-term
incarceration.
I. THE HISTORY IN BRIEF
Initially, a caveat for prospective readers of this book. This is essentially a
work of medieval intellectual history. It traces the origins of the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt rule through Christian theology and legal thought from the
beginnings of Christianity through the latter part of the 18th century, but focused
primarily on the Middle Ages, which is to say that this is not a work of modern
history. Unlike Whitman's first book, which explored the origins of modern
Western punishment methods in order to explain why contemporary United States
and European approaches to incarceration are so different, the link between this
history and contemporary policy is attenuated.2
The book also involves a lot of theology. The subtitle provides fair warning:
"the theological roots of the criminal trial." There's more on early Christian
writers like Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine and Aquinas, than common law figures
like Bracton, Coke or Blackstone. Still, those interested in the origins of modern
criminal adjudication in the West, especially in the origins of the jury trial, will
find riches here. All but experts in English and Continental legal history will learn
much, and I suspect even legal historians of the period will find new insights. Just
to be clear, I am not one of those experts. For the most part, I take the history
presented here at face value.
This is a work of intellectual history, which means that the social and
economic aspects of the transition from medieval to modern times do not receive
much emphasis. Similarly, the politics of criminal law is only an occasional
concern. Whitman notes the role of monarchial power in the 13th century origins
of the jury trial in England, but other political aspects of the tale, particularly the
jury's role in the 17th century creation of English liberties and 18th century
American civil rights, receive relatively short shrift. But this is more observation
than criticism. No work covering this span of history can encompass all
2 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
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dimensions. And as to the 17th and 18th century politics of the Anglo-American
jury trial, that story has been told often and well elsewhere.
Whitman's story is essentially that of the origins of the jury trial. The
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard provides the question driving the account, but
the account itself is of the creation of modem adjudicative systems.
Whitman structures his history around a distinction between rules concerned
with factual proof and those designed to provide what he calls moral comfort (P.
6.) Factual proof is our modem preoccupation, Whitman states. (Pp. 20-21 .)3 We
are primarily concerned in criminal trials today with factual accuracy: making sure
that those who actually committed the crime are convicted and those who did not
are acquitted. In highly populous urban settings, criminal trials normally involve
the conduct of strangers-indeed contemporary rules of procedure almost insist on
this-meaning there is more need for fact-finding in the trial today. We would
never describe a contemporary trial as "confirming" an accusation of guilt, as was
common in the early modem setting. (P. 195.)
By contrast, moral comfort rules address not factual doubt, but moral doubt.
They attempt to meet the emotional and spiritual needs of the decision-maker
asked to convict a defendant who will suffer bodily mutilation or death as a result.
Whitman argues that premodern systems needed rules that would assuage the
moral and spiritual anxiety of the judge (and later juror) who feared condemnation
by God for making a mistake in judgment, especially one that would lead to a
blood punishment: death or maiming. Whitman states that providing such moral
comfort was one of the main functions of the ordeal in the premodern era, and was
equally important in the development of the inquisitorial law of the Continent and
the jury trial in England.
Whitman's legal story begins with ordeals, those extraordinary physical tests,
called "judgments of God" because they called upon the divine to decide human
disputes. 4 The notion was that a physical test, blessed by clergy, could reveal
God's judgment upon an individual. The main types were ordeals by hot iron, cold
water, and trial by battle. (P. 53.) Each method constituted a physical test of the
defendant which, through interpretation or physical death (especially in the case of
battle), would render a legal verdict on past wrongdoing.
The status of the defendant affected the choice of ordeal. Low status
offenders were likely to face the ordeals of hot iron or cold water. In the hot iron
ordeal, a defendant's hand was burned with a hot iron, then wrapped. Three days
3 This may be true at many trials, but it does not seem true overall of contemporary criminal
procedural law. George Thomas and others have written about the way that modem U.S. law's
preoccupation with constitutional procedural rules has actually undercut the criminal justice system's
commitment to factual accuracy. See GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: How
THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS (2008).
4 Whitman actually begins with a brief account of non-Western religious and cultural
traditions that illustrate a reluctance to impose severe judgments, and then explores Christian
theology of just war and just punishment, which provides the philosophic foundation for medieval
understandings ofjustice. (Pp. 10-49.)
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later it was unwrapped and examined for signs of healing. Infection signaled
God's judgment of wrongdoing. 5 In the cold water ordeal, a naked defendant was
bound and thrown into a body of water. If the individual sank to the bottom, that
was a sign that God was ready to receive the person, and hence he or she was
innocent. If the accused floated to the surface, that was God's rejection, hence a
conviction.6
High status offenders had the option of trial by battle. Here the accused
would take on the accuser in mortal combat personally, or would hire a champion
to do battle with the accuser or the accuser's own champion. The winner of the
combat would also be the winner of the legal case.7
As other historians have noted, the rate of acquittals by ordeal was
surprisingly high. Even these daunting methods could not guarantee conviction.
(P. 65.)
Whitman argues that ordeals such as these (and these were just the most
popular, there were others) were not primarily fact-finding devices. The ordeal did
not serve the function of the Greek oracle, looking to another realm to find truths
hidden from ordinary mortals. Against the view of some other legal historians,
Whitman states that the ordeal was not about resolving fact disputes: "Instead,
what mattered most about the ordeal was their capacity to spare human beings the
responsibility for judgment." (P. 56.)8
Ordeals also did some very practical work, addressing major deficits in
existing law. Premodem law, outside of ordeals, was poorly equipped for criminal
prosecution generally. The ordinary legal process required an accuser, an
individual who would formally charge another with wrongdoing. The problem
was that making an accusation put an individual at great legal, physical and social
risk. Making an accusation was legally risky, because if the accuser did not prevail
in the case, the accused might then become the accuser, bringing equally serious
charges against the original complainant for false accusation. (Pp. 60-61.)
Similar to gang violence in some communities today, formal accusation or
witness testimony could also put the participant's life in physical jeopardy. This
was a society where vengeance killings were common, and even a matter of family
honor. Finally, although Whitman does not emphasize this, it must also have been
true that in small communities there were powerful social and economic
disincentives to both accusation and testimony leading to conviction in some cases.
5 For a good description, see ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL
JUDIcIAL ORDEAL 1 (1986).
6 Id. at 2.
' See id. at 103-126.
8 One also wonders if the ordeal also functioned simply to resolve disputes, privileging
finality over case justice. In a small community, a final judgment, even if erroneous, might be
preferred to the lingering resentments and vengeance that an unresolved dispute could foment over
months, years and even generations. I should make clear this is just my own speculation, however.
2010]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
Per Whitman, ordeals were a last resort legal measure, used when, despite
widespread belief in the guilt of the defendant in the community, prosecution in the
ordinary course was impossible. He sets out four basic obstacles to prosecution:
there was no accuser, no witness willing to testify about the crime, no confession
by the wrongdoer, and, for the high status wrongdoer, no purgative oath to resolve
the case. (P. 60.)9 The last of these obstacles requires some explanation; it also
serves to introduce the medieval fear of damnation that is central to Whitman's
account.
In premodern law, a high status offender could be acquitted of charges by
taking an oath and swearing to his or her own innocence. Such an oath needed to
be supported by others who would swear to the oath taker's character and
credibility. To the modem reader, this sounds ludicrous. What would stop the
high status (read here powerful) accused from simply swearing to innocence and
getting his friends to do the same? But as Whitman's account demonstrates, this
was not the way it worked, at least not commonly. Oaths, taken in God's name and
usually upon holy relics, were fearsome acts for medieval believers.10 Whitman
states that many high status offenders preferred trial by battle to taking such oaths,
fearing that they might be tempted to commit perjury or otherwise violate the
terms of the oath and thereby damn themselves to hell. Whitman quotes Thomas
of Chobham in the 13th century, explaining why sworn testimony was spiritually
risky:
[T]o take the name of God while declaring a falsehood is most evil, for
God neither wishes to be, nor is capable of being, a false witness. He
who makes God into a false witness in order to prove something thus
does a great injury to Him. For it is perilous to invoke God as a witness
to something about which man is not certain. (P. 75.)
The beginnings of modem criminal procedure are often dated to the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215, convened by Pope Innocent III, which prohibited clergy
from participating in ordeals. The rationale was twofold. Clergy participation in
the inherently bloody ordeals was thought to pollute clergy with bloodshed,
9 Whitman offers a fascinating and disturbing historiographic critique of the history of the
ordeal in the work of its "Grand Old Man," German historian Hermann Nottarp. Although Nottarp's
work is apparently widely cited, Whitman relates how Nottarp's interpretation was influenced by his
Nazi beliefs, as he saw the medieval judicial ordeal as a mechanism to uncover the degeneracy of
certain members of the Volk (people), a process which Nottarp explicitly linked to contemporary
(Nazi) concerns with degeneracy in the population. (Pp. 68-69.) Whitman lays considerable blame
on Nottarp for the view that ordeals were about fact-finding. Whitman says that Nottarp distorted the
historical record to accord with his view that brutal investigative methods were necessary when the
law was faced with degenerate persons who would otherwise hide the truth. (Pp. 69-71.)
10 The power of the oath and its role in the prosecution of suspected heretics played an
important role in the history of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See
generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION (1968).
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ruining their purity. This goes back to one of the oldest concerns of the church,
that its representatives not be stained by bloodshed in war or otherwise." Second,
the decree stated that it was wrong to test God, by calling on God's judgment for
matters that humans could resolve for themselves. (P. 53.)12
The effect of this decree, almost immediate in England, and much more
gradual on the Continent, was to require legal authorities to construct an entirely
secular process for deciding the most difficult criminal matters. In England, the
solution was the jury trial; in Europe, the inquisitorial method. Whitman argues
that the main challenge for both systems was to provide a method that would
compel accusation and testimony while at the same time providing a measure of
moral protection (safety from damnation) for judges.
The inquisitorial method served these ends through the development of an
elaborate law of evidence and investigative process. A person could not be
convicted except according to full proof, a legal term which required at least two
highly credible witnesses, or a confession. Half proof-a specified quantum of
credible evidence-could support the use of torture, which might then be utilized
to obtain a confession and therefore full proof. Witness testimony could also be
coerced through legal means. (Pp. 99-100.) Meanwhile the souls of judges who
ordered torture and punishment based on full proof were protected by the very
rigidity of law that they applied. Judges could attribute their actions entirely to the
law and not their own conscience.
A central principle of the inquisitorial method, its basic conception of due
process, was that the judge should render decisions based solely on legally
constituted evidence and not the judge's private knowledge of the defendant or the
controversy. A familiar concept to modern law, the judge was to consider only the
evidence in the legal record and not what the judge might have personally
observed, known by reputation, or even heard in confession (as educated leaders of
the community, clergy often served as judges, quite apart from any role in ordeals
or church duties). As Whitman points out, being part of a small community,
judges might well have their own knowledge about the facts of a criminal case.
As so often happens in law, what seemed an indisputable and universal
principle of justice was called into question when it conflicted with another critical
justice value, here the need to avoid convicting the innocent. Medieval legal and
theological commentators were greatly concerned with the following hypothetical:
What if the legal evidence in the case supported conviction, but the judge knew
from private knowledge that the accused was innocent? The authorities were, as
11 Whitman traces an early theological concern with pollution by contact with blood, that he
associates with the Jewish notion of kashrut, with a later specifically Christian concern about
pollution relating to the guilt of the person punished. (Pp. 31-49.)
12 It was a theme of Jesus' ministry, as depicted in the Gospels, that God was not to be tested
by demanding cheap supernatural tricks from the divine. See, e.g., MATrHEW 4:5-7 where the devil
dares Jesus throw himself off the highest point of the temple in Jerusalem, citing scripture from the
Psalms, that he would be saved by the Angels if he were truly the Messiah. Jesus responded by
quoting DEUTERONOMY 6:16: "[i]t is also written: 'do not put the Lord your God to the test."'
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we say, divided. The great theological and legal authority Augustine held that
even here, private knowledge must be excluded. Otherwise, the whole justice-as-
law edifice might crumble. Should an innocent person be convicted as a result, the
fault would lie with the witness or witnesses who testified falsely, and not with the
judge who entered the conviction based on the legal record. (P. 113.) Augustine
assured the legally rigorous judge: "So long as you do not use your private
knowledge, it is the law that kills him, and not you." (P. 112.) Other authorities in
continental law disagreed and suggested a variety of means by which the judge
might avoid wrongful conviction and yet abide by the basic principle that the legal
process should not be contaminated by private knowledge. (Pp. 113-14.)
Meanwhile, in England the criminal process developed in a quite different
fashion. Judges were largely protected from the risk of damnation by the
extraordinary new institution of the trial jury. The powerful English monarchy,
wanting to extend its authority over local powers, particularly church officials and
nobles, saw the elimination of ordeals as an opportunity to expand its jurisdiction.
The king resolved to transform the already existing presenting jury into a body for
adjudication, presided over by royally appointed judges.
Prior to these changes, the presenting jury had served as a kind of grand jury,
bringing formal accusations of crime, especially homicide, according to the
knowledge of its own members. It provided a means for the king to compel
criminal accusations. But beginning in the early 13th century, the jury took on
new roles, being required not only to accuse, but to provide testimony, and most
importantly, to issue a final verdict on guilt. Whitman traces the way in which
juries took on these new roles both in land disputes and in serious criminal cases,
controversies that were apparently of nearly equal moment in feudal England. (Pp.
126-44.)
The development of the jury eased the responsibilities of the judge. The
judge no longer bore the moral weight of defendant's condemnation in serious
criminal cases. The judge simply followed the legal dictates of the jury's verdict.
In Whitman's terms, the judge's soul was protected from divine judgment even
where the bloodiest punishments were imposed. Jurors were not so fortunate.
Whitman documents the extraordinary responsibilities of criminal jurors in
early modem England. They were to serve as witnesses, using their own private
knowledge of the matter, if available. Whitman shows how the English common
law system contemplated juror use of private knowledge well into the 18th
century. (P. 152.) In Bushel's Case, one of the landmark 17th century cases
concerning criminal juries, Chief Justice Vaughn upheld the jury's right to acquit
in the case based on the possibility that jurors decided the case based on their own
private knowledge as opposed to the public evidence. (Pp. 177-78.)
Nor could jurors reassure themselves that they were simply following an
elaborate set of proof rules. English common law lacked the mechanistic
categories of full and half proof characteristic of the continent's inquisitorial
method. Instead, jurors were required to rely heavily on their own consciences to
evaluate the evidence and make just decisions. (P. 153.)
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And if all this were not enough, jurors faced a variety of judicial sanctions for
failing to reach the "right" verdict. In the early modem era, jurors in land dispute
cases could face a subsequent prosecution for attaint brought by the losing party.
(Pp. 140-44.) In criminal cases, jurors could be fined and sometimes imprisoned.
The infamous Star Chamber frequently prosecuted criminal jurors post-verdict for
alleged wrongdoing in decision-making. (P. 162.) Meanwhile, trial judges
commonly coerced jurors to reach verdicts by locking them up without food or
water until they reached a decision. And we complain about jury duty today! 13
But Whitman also describes a number of ways that English law provided juror
relief from the worst of their moral and spiritual burdens. He argues that the rule
of juror unanimity was developed not to ensure factual accuracy, but as a moral
comfort rule. (Pp. 142-44.) Jurors would not feel themselves so individually
responsible, if all shared in the decision.
Several measures that reduced the chance of capital punishment also relieved
the moral pressure on jurors. Benefit of clergy doctrine meant that many otherwise
capital cases were taken out of capital punishment. (P. 156.) The development of
transportation as an alternative to the death penalty likewise diminished jurors'
emotional burdens for the most severe punishment. Finally, juries were permitted
to return special verdicts in criminal cases, especially where affirmative defenses
such as self-defense were involved. (Pp. 154-55.) This limited the jury's role to
factfinder, again reducing the jury's responsibility for the ultimate punishment.
Whitman makes clear that the challenges of judging were a major
preoccupation of early modern thinkers, both in the church and out. The church
had its own judgment processes for regulating its affairs which required
elaboration and justification. The new secular legal procedures also demanded
explication and defense. In both realms, theological writing provided a major
resource. Whitman documents the way Christian theologians, both Catholic and
Protestant, developed distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate doubt in
judging both religious and secular matters. Particularly important in England was
the Protestant literature of conscience. Here writers distinguished between doubts
and scruples. (P. 179.) Contrary to modem usage, "scruples" referred to highly
emotional and largely irrational fears and squeamishness. A common example
used by the commentators was a highly gendered (read here sexist) one. They
described the screeches of a female on contact with a squirming frog or chicken.
(Pp. 179-80.) Such fear had no rational basis, the animals being harmless. By
contrast, "doubts" represented rational questions about the extent of knowledge.
Jurors should not be influenced by mere emotion, by scruples, and thereby avoid
doing their critical but onerous duty. They should, however, heed rational doubts,
and take what was called the safer path, acquitting when there was any reasoned
basis for uncertainty.
13 Punishment ofjurors for allegedly erroneous verdicts was finally ended with the creation of
the common law "liberties" following the English Civil War in the 17th century. (P. 162.)
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From this theological literature, and from the particular needs of early modem
jurors, arose the reasonable doubt formula. Whitman maintains that the formula
was "intended to ease the fears of those jurors who might otherwise refuse to
pronounce the defendant guilty." (P. 186.) Writing of both jurors and judges,
Whitman states the 18th century legal and religious ideal was "a reasoned decision
[that] would leave the soul of the Christian judge safe." (P. 191.)
The reasonable doubt formula appears in the Anglo-American legal record in
a number of different places almost simultaneously in the late 18th century. John
Adams' arguments in defense of British soldiers charged in the so-called Boston
massacre preceding the American Revolution is cited, as are a number of cases
tried in the Old Bailey courthouse in London in the 1780s. (Pp. 193-99.) In
accord with other legal historians, Whitman says the rule had no single author. He
speculates that one reason for its appearance at this time might be due to the
American Revolution, which temporarily ended transportation, and thereby put in
question the future of severe punishment. (P. 200.) (For most of the 18th century,
forcible transportation of prisoners to the American colonies provided the major
alternative to capital punishment in England.)
II. FACTUAL PROOF V. MORAL COMFORT, RECONSIDERED
The first question to ask of this historical account, is whether its explanation
is persuasive. Did the reasonable doubt standard and the jury trial arise as
Whitman describes? Was Christian theology as important, and in the fashion that
Whitman maintains? Frankly I am not equipped to critique the particular historical
account that the author provides about ordeals and their successors in English and
continental law. Here I must defer to others more expert in this area of legal
history. But I do have some questions about Whitman's understanding of moral
comfort rules. Did these address essentially nonrational anxieties of decision-
makers or did they also address serious concerns about moral judgments inherent
in criminal law? Pursuing this question leads to further questions about the role of
religion in criminal judgment historically, and today.
As we have seen, Whitman argues that premodem legal systems were less
concerned with factual proof than are modem ones, and were relatively more
concerned with the moral dimension of judgment than we are today. Although
Whitman is persuasive about this distinction in some respects, there is an important
ambiguity in his distinction between factual proof and moral comfort rules.
Examined more closely, these seem to include two potentially different
oppositions.
The first opposition, which seems the most important for Whitman, is
between emotion and reason. While never stated in just this way, it is a clear
subtext of the historical account. It is most clearly evident in the discussion of
early modem writers who distinguished between illegitimate emotional scruples
and reasoned doubt. The opposition accords with the traditional Western view
(increasingly rejected today) of emotion as the rival of reason in decision-
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making. 14  Whitman reports that early modem decision-makers suffered from
emotional, nonrational anxieties about judgment in cases where factual proof was
clear. These anxieties were often expressed in religious terms-a fear of
damnation. In Whitman's account, moral comfort rules arose to assuage these
historically-specific religious/emotional anxieties. The emotion-versus-reason
dichotomy strongly supports Whitman's contemporary argument that moral
comfort rules, like proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are archaic because they
address a problem-emotional/religious anxieties about judgment-that we no
longer have.
But this is not the only way of understanding the factual proof versus moral
comfort rules distinction. It might involve the difference between fact
determination and moral judgment in criminal responsibility. Factual proof goes
to basic determinations of who did what, while moral judgment concerns
assessments of culpability and penal severity. This reading potentially views
religion differently, not just as a source of fear and anxiety, but one that could
provide moral guidance for the law. This reading may also change our modem
perspective on so-called moral comfort rules. To the extent that these rules address
concerns with moral judgment (as opposed to nonrational emotional anxieties),
they would appear to have continuing significance today.
The ambiguity latent in the factual proof versus moral comfort distinction
becomes apparent when we look more closely at Whitman's basic argument. We
can begin with his point that questions of factual proof were relatively less
important in criminal cases in medieval and early modem times than they are
today. This accords with some basic facts of demographics and law. In very small
communities-and even cities in premodem times were small by modem
standards-decision-makers likely had more personal knowledge about
wrongdoing in the community than is true today, when judges and jurors are
usually asked to resolve cases involving complete strangers.
But just how much of a difference is there between premodern and modem
systems in their concern with facts? Surely there were still significant problems
with factual proof in premodern times.' 5  Indeed Whitman concedes as much,
though only in passing. (P. 19.) But what does seem clear from Whitman's
14 Most of those working in the relatively new field of law and emotion argue that emotion
often, or even always, has a rational basis and therefore the critical question for law is not whether
emotion will affect legal judgment, but how it does, and how it should. See Susan A. Bandes,
Foreword, Symposium, Emotions in Context: Exploring the Interaction Between Emotions and Legal
Institutions, 33 VT. L. REv. 387, 387-88 (2009).
15 Certainly a modem observer might question the factual proof presented in a medieval or
early modem legal proceeding. Knowledge of wrongdoing in a small community is often an
amalgam of rumor, reputation, hearsay, and direct knowledge-not what we would today consider
reliable. In pre-modem times, communities of course lacked access to modem investigative
techniques, from the most basic methods of professional police investigation, to more scientific forms
of evidence such as fingerprints or DNA. As a result, the modem fact-finder might have serious
doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence presented in many pre-modem and early modem
criminal cases.
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account, is that there were a significant number of troublesome cases, which were
troublesome not because of doubts about facts, but because of a variety of fears,
including spiritual fears, of the consequences of accusation, testimony, and
judgment.16  This supports the emotion-versus-reason understanding of moral
comfort rules.
Whitman's historical argument also rests importantly on a contention about
modem law, namely, that problems of factual proof predominate in contemporary
criminal trials. Is this true? It depends on how we define factual problems.
Certainly there are many criminal trials today where the critical issues are factual
in the most basic sense. Was a homicide committed? If so, who committed the
deadly act? Who fired the shot that killed the victim? Usually, though not always,
these questions will involve straightforward fact matters such as proof that a
person who was alive no longer is, and that death occurred by a bullet shot from a
gun wielded by defendant. But most criminal trials focus more on why certain acts
were done rather than what was done or by whom. They are more why-dun-it than
who-dun-it. Issues of mens rea, affirmative defenses such as self-defense or
insanity, are frequently critical, and these explicitly demand the fact-finder's moral
judgment. Distinguishing between a murder and manslaughter based on
provocation, between a sane and an insane defendant, require the decision-maker
to make critical normative judgments, as well as make factual determinations. The
anxious decision-maker may not worry so much about what happened, as about
how it should be categorized under law. Facts and norms cannot be neatly
distinguished, meaning that concerns with factual proof and moral judgment
remain intertwined today. If moral comfort rules address the difficulties of moral
judgment in assessing culpability, then perhaps not so much has changed over the
millennia.
Now we turn to the role of religion in the development of moral comfort rules.
Whitman argues throughout that decision-maker moral anxieties in premodern
times were theologically based. Certainly they were often expressed in Christian
terms. But he does not do enough, in my view, to explain what this means. Just
how did the Christian accuser, witness, judge or juror believe that his soul might
be at risk? 17 Again, there are two possible readings of the relevant legal history.
16 There is another historiographic problem lurking here as well. To what extent did the
historical actors Whitman writes about themselves distinguish between concerns about factual proof
and moral comfort? One of the central trends of modernity, in law as in other fields, is an ever-
increasing specialization of knowledge, including increasing linguistic precision. Just as the
categories of evidence law and substantive criminal law and criminal procedure would not have been
distinguished in pre-modem times, so this difference between moral comfort and factual proof is a
modem one.
This introduces a caution. Because historical authors did not write with the precision of
modem authors, we cannot be certain of their original meaning. What may sound to us like a worry
about moral judgment may have included concerns about factual proof. The difficulty of
distinguishing these categories can be seen even in modem adjudication.
17 To give an example, Whitman documents many instances of individuals fearful that they
might violate an oath sworn to God by making factual errors, usually by lying. (P. 75.) The witness
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One is that the anxieties of early modem decision-makers were essentially
emotional as opposed to rational. In a religious age, fear of divine damnation
caused some fact-finders to exaggerate any factual doubt, precluding conviction of
even the clearly guilty. This seems to be Whitman's view.
Whitman generally takes a kind of anthropological view of religious belief,
seeing it as a defining feature of a less rational, pre-scientific age. In a more
religious time, doubts about guilt could be easily exaggerated, growing into a terror
of damnation. "The slightest doubt may seem overwhelming, if we are uneasy
about our own potential responsibility for the act of judgment." (P. 21.) In
Whitman's view, moral comfort rules were, "addressed to the simmering inner
fears of the anxious judge. Instead of offering a sober algorithm for assessing
factual probabilities, they offer the judge a means of calming himself down." (Pp.
21-22.) Overall, this suggests the emotional, nonrational role of religion in both
provoking fear and providing reassurance.
There's no question that early modem law was concerned with judges'
emotional reservations about imposing harsh punishment. Such reservations are a
basic part of the human condition. It feels bad to hurt another who has not
personally hurt us. It goes against the moral grain for most of us. But from a legal
perspective, a purely emotive reluctance to convict even those who appear
factually guilty, is illegitimate. It is the equivalent of a soldier who refuses to
fight. Just as the military creates rules and structures to ensure that soldiers fight
on the battlefield, so rules and structures needed to be enacted to encourage judges
and jurors to make tough decisions. This is basic to Whitman's argument-and
makes sense.
Might moral comfort rules, though, have been designed to do more than
assuage the nonrational anxieties of decision-makers? 18  I suspect they were-
rules so important almost always have multiple finctions-but cannot pretend to
make the historical case here. Instead I want to pursue a related, largely
nonhistorical, inquiry. Using several of the scriptural sources that Whitman cites, I
consider how these might provide moral guidance in criminal law.
Anxieties about imposing severe criminal punishment, whether ancient or
modem, may stem from legitimate concerns about overstepping the bounds of
human judgment. They encourage moral humility in judgment. In this regard,
who commits peijury, the judge who convicts the factually innocent, or the witness sworn to tell all
who despite knowledge of the case states his own ignorance of the facts-these clearly put their souls
at risk. But, from a modem perspective, these instances just describe basic moral failures. People
know what they should do, but can't manage to do it. It's not clear why these examples would create
particular anxieties for decision-makers about judgment. One possibility is that in an age where
Christianity emphasized the sinfulness of humanity, decision-makers might need explicit reassurance
that they had the moral virtue needed to tell and ascertain the truth in matters of great controversy.
Perhaps decision-makers did not come to legal cases with the same moral confidence that most
modem decision-makers do. This is not an argument that Whitman makes in the book, however.
18 Whitman does suggest that moral judgment is the concern of moral comfort rules. For
example: "[O]ur ancestors dreaded ... the moral and spiritual responsibilities ofjudgment." (P. 11.)
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religion may provide a distinction between what humans may properly decide in
judging each other, and what should be left for God's judgment.
III. LIMITING HUMAN JUDGMENT: ANOTHER VIEW OF CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURE
Whitman identifies several passages from the New Testament as especially
important to early theological writers on judgment. The most often cited is Jesus'
admonition: "Judge not, that ye not be judged."19 Unfortunately, Whitman does
not discuss its interpretation in any depth. Like so many passages from scripture,
it can be interpreted in several ways. For example, the admonition could mean that
believers should eschew any form of judgment of human wrongdoing, that they
should not participate in any legal process. This was never a popular
interpretation, however, and certainly does not fit the legal history discussed here.
There is another reading though: that believers should avoid any final
condemnation of another human being, should avoid any final determination of
individual worth, because only God can judge the soul. 20
This concern with the limits of human judgment can also be found, I believe,
in another passage from Christian scripture that Whitman cites, although again
Whitman does not use the passage to make this point. It is the story of Jesus and
the woman accused of adultery.
In the Gospel of John (the only of the four Gospels in which this account
appears) Jesus is tested by "the scribes and the Pharisees" who present him with a
woman caught in the act of adultery. They state that the law of Moses commands
that she be stoned to death.2' Asked what should be done, Jesus delays for a time,
writing with his finger on the ground, and then says: "Let anyone among you who
is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.",22 The group slowly melts away,
beginning with the elders. Jesus continues writing on the ground. When the others
are gone, Jesus says: "'Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?'
She said, 'No one, sir.' And Jesus said, 'Neither do I condemn you. Go your way,
and from now on do not sin again."'
23
Whitman calls this as an "antique" story. He provides a medieval
interpretation that supported basic principles of inquisitorial law. According to the
19 MnTrHEw 7:1 (King James). Whitman uses the King James version of the Bible, certainly
appropriate to a discussion of early modem English law. The New Revised Standard Version,
probably the preeminent English-language translation of the Christian Bible today is: "Do not judge,
so that you may not be judged."
20 See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited, 80 PROC. &
ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHiL. ASSN. 45, 55-60 (2006); JEFFRIE G. MURPiHY, GETTrING EvEN:
FORGIVENESS AND rrs LmmIrS 95-113 (2003). In Christianity, on the day of judgment, God will
determine the ultimate fate of all mortals. E.g., MArrHEw 10:15; 11:22, 11:25; 12:36 (New Revised
Standard Version [hereinafter NRSV]).
21 JOHN 8:2-5 (NRSV).
22 JoHN 8:6-7 (NRSV).
23 JoHN8:10-11 (NRSV).
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medieval scholar cited, the account proved the necessity of following strict legal
process: without a formal accusation, there could be no judgment. Jesus would not
use his own private knowledge of the woman's sin to condemn her. (P. 108.) But
this is hardly the only possible reading of this passage. Many have read, and do
read the passage, as providing a message about the importance of mercy and the
need to avoid condemning sinners.24 This accords with a central theme of Jesus'
ministry, namely, saving those-the unclean, tax collectors, prostitutes and
others-who might be condemned by a strict reading of Mosaic law. It is also
consistent with Whitman's own suggestion that modem criminal law may do too
much to assuage the moral anxieties of criminal decision-makers in cases
involving the most severe punishments.
Before proceeding to that modem critique, just a few last words about the
treatment of religion in this book. When it comes to religion, there almost seems
to be two different Whitmans here: the intellectual historian and the modem
commentator. Whitman the intellectual historian takes religion and Christian
theology seriously. He sees it as the key to a number of legal developments that
other historians have badly misread. He convincingly documents the way in which
a fear of damnation was a motivating force in medieval times as it is for relatively
few today. And as we will see, he appreciates the wisdom in approaching serious
criminal judgment with "fear and trembling." For all that, he deserves
commendation.
But there is another Whitman, the modem commentator who seems openly
dismissive of religion as a guide to moral or legal thought, who views its influence
on law as archaic. For example, Whitman writes early on that the New Testament
warning "Judge not lest ye be judged!" is "hardly more than a pretty piety for us."
(P. 10.) Yet, as we have seen, these words could be a serious admonition about the
limits of human judgment. These words could guide judgment, even today.
To make a legal analogy, the cynic, considering the reality of contemporary
American criminal punishment, might dismiss the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" as fancy words, signifying
little. And it is true that the words by themselves accomplish little, but as a
constitutional command in a legal system that takes such commands seriously (or
does sometimes), these words can have, and have had, major effects on
adjudication and punishment. Abstract ideas can motivate serious action. And
yes, sometimes those ideas may be religious even today.
The modem Whitman strongly suggests that religious belief is fundamentally
primitive, verging on the superstitious. Thus, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule,
which found its origins in concerns with damnation, is "a living fossil from an
24 Abraham Lincoln used this passage in his Second Inaugural Address, urging reconciliation
between North and South as the Civil War came to an end. "It may seem strange that any men should
dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let
us judge not that we be not judged." See RONALD C. WHITE JR., LINCOLN'S GREATEST SPEECH: THE
SECOND INAUGURAL 15 (2002).
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older moral world." (P. 4.) Continuing with the evolutionary metaphor, Whitman
writes of the present day, when the "seas of religion have receded, after many
centuries. But the landscape of the law still includes many of its older diluvian
features...." (P. 7.)
The seas of religion have receded? For some groups, for some versions of
religion, undoubtedly this is so. But the notion that modernity is nonreligious is
demonstrably wrong. Many intellectuals wish that this were true. Some predict
the day is approaching. But, it is not presently true in the United States where the
author teaches and where this book is published.25 Now, Whitman may be making
a much smaller point, associating religion with a particular belief in damnation, but
if so, he should make this critical distinction explicit.
The same discomfort with religion qua religion (that is, as a timeless source
of moral and spiritual ideas) appears in Whitman's handling of scripture. Whitman
pays considerable attention to medieval theological writers, but he does not handle
particularly well the scriptural sources that should be at the heart of any Christian
theological discussion. In fairness, some of these shortcomings may reflect the
shortcomings of the medieval commentators who are his main subject. I believe,
however, they also reflect a limited understanding of some critical source material.
Whitman's favorite scriptural quotation provides illustration. Whitman early
on refers to the "famous injunction of Saint Matthew-Judge not lest ye be
judged!" (P. 3.) Several times he attributes these words to St. Matthew. But the
words come from Jesus, in his Sermon on the Mount, as quoted in the Gospel of
Matthew. Matthew is the reporter, not the speaker, a distinction with a major
theological difference.
Whitman frequently quotes scriptural passages without providing context,
essentially assuming that the words can be taken at face value. But this method is
no more useful in theology than in law. How much would we know about First
Amendment principles, both with respect to the press and religion, from a bare
reading of its text? At a minimum, scripture must be read in its biblical context,
with attention to surrounding passages and larger themes. It is not self-
explanatory. Recall again, "Judge not, lest ye be judged" and the differing
interpretations mentioned earlier. 26 Or, the different readings of the story of Jesus
and the adulteress, also mentioned above.
25 For the role of religion and faith in U.S. life, see the Gallup poll figures at Gallup,
http://www.gallup.com/pollU1690/religion.aspx. The importance of religion in recent presidential
races in the United States also points out its contemporary significance to many.
26 Supra note 19. In general, Whitman makes a sharp distinction between Judaism and
Christianity, distinguishing between what he calls the Jewish and Christian scriptures, and generally
treating Christianity as a later but distinctive outgrowth of Judaism. This was certainly the view of
most medieval Christians, and probably many Christians today (and perhaps Jews as well), but one
might argue that this reads back into history later religious and historical developments. One could
say that modem Judaism and Christianity arose from the same tradition, at roughly the same time,
and in reaction to the same critical event, the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE
(Common Era) by Roman forces. This Jewish disaster was exacerbated by the expulsion of most
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IV. MODERN IMPLICATIONS OF WHITMAN'S HISTORY: THE IMPOSITION OF
SEVERE PUNISHMENT
One of the great challenges of legal history, and an aspect that distinguishes it
from other forms of history, is its normative dimension. In other fields of history it
is sufficient to explain what happened. Historians ask: What were the causes of
World War I? What impact did the abolitionist movement have on the politics of
antebellum era? Answering these questions is difficult, and involves analysis as
well as data collection, but they are explicitly queries about the past and not the
present. The modem academic historian tries to determine what happened,
sometimes including a critique of historical actors, but rarely with the aim of
drawing explicit lessons for contemporary policy. The academic historian worries
a great deal about presentism, the criticism that a historical account is distorted by
being viewed through the lens of present day needs and biases. Lesson-drawing is
usually left to politicians and teachers without PhDs.
By contrast, legal history concerns the history of law, meaning the history of
legal norms. How could its history avoid the normative? Equally important, I
suspect, most legal historians work within the legal academy, which is also
intensely normative. While few legal historians today engage in so-called lawyers'
history, (the study of ancient doctrine to inform contemporary legal decision-
making), even the most sophisticated writers recognize the normative dimension of
their accounts. Whether the subject is the law of slavery, antitrust, or the
regulation of the family, historical accounts of the law have contemporary import.
At a minimum, they reveal important aspects about the law's development, which
may inform contemporary understandings of the nature of law and its practice.
I can make the point more plainly. At least on occasion, most legal historians
must present their work to legal academics who are not historians. Papers will be
delivered to audiences that include experts in administrative law, constitutional
law, and criminal law, among others. Such presentations can be defining moments
for any legal academic's career. The moment that all academics imagine during
the writing process is when the floor is opened to questions following the paper's
presentation, when some skeptical professor asks the "so what" question. So what
difference does this make? What changes as a result of your insights? And,
particularly for the legal historian, the question becomes: So what does this all
Jews from Judea less than a century later in 135 CE, also by the Romans in response to a Jewish
revolt.
In the Jewish tradition, these events are usually seen as fostering the development of rabbinic
Judaism, focused on scriptural study and synagogue worship as opposed to a Temple-focused religion
dominated by a hereditary priestly class. See RAYMOND P. SCHEINDLIN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
JEWISH PEOPLE: FROM LEGENDARY TIMES TO MODERN STATEHOOD 51-54 (1998). Likewise, the
development of a distinct Christian sect during this time might be seen as partially a reaction to
events that seem to put into question God's ancient covenant with the people of Israel. See JACK
MILES, CHRIST: A CRISIS IN THE LIFE OF GOD 109-18 (2001). Finally, Christianity and Judaism still
share a large portion of the same scripture.
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mean for us today? In most such settings it will not be sufficient for the legal
historian to simply say, we now know more about our legal past than we did
before. The work must have some contemporary significance to satisfy the
demands of this audience. Whitman understands this.
Whitman does not shy away from the contemporary implications of this
history. Not at all. Indeed, his efforts in this regard are refreshingly candid.
While his policy arguments are too briefly presented to be truly persuasive, he
includes a number of points that are intriguing, even provocative, especially for a
reviewer with, frankly, his own contemporary agenda.
Whitman first addresses the immediate significance of this history. He says it
explains the confusion that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule can inspire in 21st-
century jurors. He writes:
[T]he reasonable doubt formula seems mystifying today because we have
lost sight of its original purpose. The origins of reasonable doubt lie in a
forgotten world of premodem Christian theology, a world whose
concerns were quite different from our own. Our modem law is the
product of a deep transformation, in the course of which some of the old
religious foundations of the criminal trial were forgotten. (P. 2.)
And, the reasonable doubt formula:
was the product of the world troubled by moral anxieties that no longer
trouble us much at all. This makes it unsurprising that our law should
find itself in a state of confusion today. We are asking the reasonable
doubt standard to serve a function that it was not originally designed to
serve, and it does its work predictably badly. (P. 5.)
I do not doubt that if we were to start from scratch, we might come up with a
more readily comprehensible standard of proof for jurors than what appears in
reasonable doubt instructions today. I do wonder, however, how much effect
modernizing the language and explicitly focusing jurors' attention on factual proof
rather than moral judgment would have in most cases. After all, every decent
criminal trial attorney has his or her own set piece about reasonable doubt to be
used in final argument, explaining the rule in a manner that jurors can readily
comprehend (or so the attorney believes). In passing, Whitman also raises a larger
question about the alleged genius of the common law method, the way it puts old
legal forms to new uses. At least in this instance, he argues that the old form, the
reasonable doubt standard, poorly serves the law's modem needs, being focused on
moral judgment rather than factual proof.
Whitman, however, has larger concerns than the wording of jury instructions.
He has problems with the basic structure of contemporary jury trials in U.S.
criminal cases, especially the elaborate rules of evidence which restrict the facts
that a jury may hear, forcing them to solve the factual puzzle with many pieces
missing. He notes that despite the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule and manifold
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procedural protections, juries still get the facts wrong sometimes and convict the
innocent. He observes: "This is hardly surprising, given the strangely fragmentary
factual puzzles they are asked to solve; creating artificial mysteries is a weirdly
oblique way of pursuing the high moral goal of protecting the innocent." (P. 208.)
As have a number of recent commentators, he argues that the continental approach
to factual assessment at trial makes more sense, citing specifically French and
German law.
Although I am largely sympathetic to this critique, it is not presented in
sufficient depth to be persuasive, nor does it relate well to the history presented.
Here particularly, Whitman's skimping on the modem political role of the jury
limits the power of his argument. The American devotion to juries today turns as
much on their potential to serve as a moral and political check on executive and
even legislative authority, as it does on their particular skills in fact fimding.
Perhaps this political role is itself archaic, given the highly representative nature of
our democracy today, but still, it is a critical part of the discussion about juries.
This political role may also connect to a final modem implication of this history
that Whitman alludes to briefly, and on which I wish to enlarge, though only
briefly.
Whitman uses as an epigram for his conclusion, a quotation from a first
century BCE (Before Common Era) writer, Publilius Syrus: "The judge passes
judgment on himself as much as on the offender." (P. 202.) Whitman argues that
criminal judgment is always a test of the character of the judge as well as perhaps
of the accused. He questions how well contemporary criminal processes
comprehend this though. "The larger truth is that we have slowly been losing the
capacity to gaze into our own breasts and ask ourselves hard questions about when
and how we have the right to punish others." (P. 7.) He writes:
[W]e have lost the old conviction that judging and punishing are morally
fearsome acts. We have a far weaker sense than our ancestors that we
should doubt our own moral authority when judging other human beings
.... Open-hearted human beings condemn others in a spirit of humility,
of duteousness, of fear and trembling about their own moral standing.
That is what our ancestors, for all their bloodiness, believed; . . . (Pp.
211-12.)
In this regard, Whitman makes specific mention of the ready use of long
sentences of incarceration in the United States. (Pp. 211-12.)
But can this notion of "fear and humbling" actually inform law? What would
such a jurisprudence look like? Two different aspects of contemporary
punishment practices-the law regulating the imposition of the death penalty and
that governing the imposition of life sentences-suggest an answer.
With respect to the death penalty-and a great deal of Whitman's history is
effectively about capital punishment-the United States Supreme Court has taken
this notion of fear and trembling very seriously, albeit using rather different
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language, and to some extent, reasoning. As Justice Antonin Scalia and others
have noted, the Eighth Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence is in some
respects inconsistent and illogical, requiring, on the one hand, decision-making
according to rules, and on the other, insisting that sentencers may consider a wide
range of potentially mitigating evidence.27  First, it's worth noting that all
constitutionally approved systems of capital punishment in the United States
provide for jury participation in sentencing, and in most but not all instances, death
requires jury approval.28 This is not a decision left to judges who, by professional
training, will be less inclined to rely on personal conscience. Juries must be
allowed to hear and consider all manner of evidence, including essentially a life
history of the defendant.29 Mandatory death penalties are prohibited, regardless of
how restrictive the legal conditions for such a mandate are.30 Juries must be
accurately informed of their primary responsibility for the decision.3 1 In short, the
jurisprudence of death suggests that it is proper only when rendered by a jury that
takes personal responsibility for it-a jury, in other words, that approaches its task
with fear and trembling.
32
By contrast, there is no special jurisprudence of life imprisonment. Such
sentences are almost always rendered by a judge, not a jury. Indeed, juries are
often kept in the dark about the penal consequences of their verdict. What might
appear to the jury a simple theft or drug possession case, might actually be a Three
Strikes case in which life imprisonment is at stake.33 And why are the penal
consequences kept secret from our much-hailed lay decision-makers? Because
judges fear that such knowledge might affect the jury's verdict. Judges know that
fear and trembling at inflicting severe pain can change outcomes.
In fact, the trend to require minimum mandatory punishments, even
mandatory life sentences, can be seen as an effort to minimize the chance that any
27 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28 The Supreme Court has also approved death penalty schemes in which the judge decides
the final sentence, following an advisory jury decision. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995);
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977).
29 E.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803 (2001); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399
(1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
30 E.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1987); Skipper, 476 U.S. 1.
31 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (prosecutor's argument that the jury
decision was not final because of an automatic appeal found to be misleading). Cf California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983) (permissible to instruct sentencing jury that the governor has the
power to pardon defendant and override any death sentence).
32 One important caveat must be added to this generalization. All jurors must be death
qualified, meaning that no prospective juror can be seated whose views about the death penalty
would prevent or substantially impair the juror's consideration of life or death penalties in the case.
See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985). As a
practical matter, this means that jurors with serious reservations about capital punishment may be
excluded from service.
33 See People v. Nichols, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (1997) (trial court properly refused to answer
jury note inquiring if the case involved Three Strikes).
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decision-maker would be emotionally reluctant to convict or punish. That is
because, with mandatory minimum penalties, the most important sentencing
decision is often made by the legislature, or the voting public through the initiative
process. Sentencing rendered in this fashion involves very little sentencer humility
or concern for the individual defendant, because the actual identities of those to be
sentenced are unknown at the time of the law's approval. They are identified only
by their (future) label of conviction. I have written elsewhere that this should be
seen as a violation of what I call emotive due process, a principle essentially
congruent with Whitman's historic account.
34
V. CONCLUSION
The instinct to avoid hurting another who has done one no personal wrong is a
powerful and yet underestimated drive in human relations.35 Sympathy and
empathy for others provides the emotional foundation for morals, which in turn
guides criminal law. But instinct is not moral principle, and fellow feeling is far
from an infallible guide to judging individual responsibility. Thus we find the age-
old tension between the need to judge wrongful conduct, sometimes harshly, and
the desire to avoid causing another pain. The tension can be found in matters as
mundane as a professor issuing final grades in law school, or as momentous as a
verdict that will trigger a punishment of death or life in prison. This tension
underlies Whitman's account of the making of modem criminal procedure and
remains a central feature of our legal institutions today.
There is no final resolution to this tension. The question is always about
striking the right balance. Too much legalization of responsibility, too much trust
in rules and too little in personal conscience, and criminal judgment can become
cruel, and in strange ways arbitrary. 36  Load too much onto the individual
conscience, and judgment itself may be resisted. The decision process may seize
up.
Putting aside one's view of death as a punishment, the balance struck by the
United States Supreme Court between rules and discretion, and reason and emotion
in capital jurisprudence, is remarkable. No person should be condemned to death
without the opportunity to present his own unique value to decision-makers who
must take personal responsibility for his condemnation. But should we limit this
34 Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California's Three Strikes Law, 6
BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 483, 494 (2002).
35 See, e.g., LT. COL. DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING
TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY 37-39 (1996).
36 This is because the impulse for mercy is driven underground, and can be expressed only in
discretionary decisions such as charging, not regulated by law. And these impulses are not uniformly
distributed across the defendant population. See LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE
STRiKEs-THE IMPACT AFTER MORE THEN A DECADE 8 (2005); Joshua E. Bowers, "The Integrity of
the Game is Everything": The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1164, 1183-84 (2001).
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principle to the penalty of physical death? Sentences of life imprisonment
constitute civic death. They entail extraordinary pain and IOSS. 37 I believe such
penalties should not be inflicted without making an individual judge, or perhaps
jury, personally responsible for the decision, rather than just functioning as the
implementer of pre-existing law.
Whitman's book is about legal bloodshed and the struggles of religious and
legal authorities to justify and guide that bloodshed. Here the human instinct
against harming others is the strongest. But the time has come to recognize that
bloodshed is not the only form of violence, and physical death not the only form of
severe punishment, that should be approached with humility and trepidation.
I sometimes think if Americans could, just for a few moments, feel the weight
of the time served by prisoners in this country-all 2.3 million of them-the
nation's penal policies would begin to shift.38 But with prisoners out of sight, and
physically supported by the state (even if poorly), the moral instinct to refrain from
harm is blunted. We may recoil at the casual cruelties of our ancestors, but I
suspect they might be impressed by our own.
37 See Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America's Other
Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentence of Death by Incarceration, 88 THE PRISON J. 328, 328
(2008).
38 The 2.3 million figure is taken from a study of the nation's prisoner population at the end of
2007. See N.C. Aizenman, New High in US. Prison Numbers, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at Al.
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